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Abstrak: Artikel	 ini	menjelaskan	kemunculan	Hizbut	Tahrir	 Indonesia	
(HTI)	 sejak	 tahun	 1980an,	 di	 masa-masa	 demokrasi.	 HTI	 dengan	
menggunakan sarana demokrasi	justru	berupaya	mendirikan	kekhalifahan	
dengan	 implementasi	 hukum	 Islam	 dalam	 kehidupan	 sehari-hari,	 tapi	
tidak	dengan	cara	kekerasan,	melainkan	dengan	damai.	Walau	demikian	
gerakan	HTI	 ini	 ditengarai	 justru	menghambat	 proses	 demokratisasi	 di	
Indonesia.
Katakunci: Fundamentalis,	Demokrasi,	Kekhalifahan.
Abstract: This	paper	 examines	 the	 emergence	 of	HizbutTahrirIndonesia	
(HTI)	as	an	openly	fundamentalist	movement	in	the	democratic	era.	HTI	
existed	in	Indonesia	since	the	early	1980s.	This	paper	explores	how	HTI	use	
the	democratic	public	sphere	to	disseminate	its	ultimate	goal	restoring	an	
Islamic	Caliphate	marked	by	the	implementation	Islamic	laws	or	syari’ah	
in	daily	life.	Furthermore,	whether	HTI	can	be	consistent	to	refrain	from	
restoring	violence.	Therefore,	HTI’s	 activities	may	possibility	hamper	 the	
process	of	consolidating	democracy	in	Indonesia.	
Keywords: Fundamentalits,	Democracy,	Caliphate.
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Introduction
The downfall of Suharto’s regime in 1998 produced an explosion 
of social, political and religious movements as channels for aspirations 
that had been repressed for decades. One consequence of this 
‘sense of freedom’ was the rise of political Islam. The aspirations of 
political Islam in the post-Suharto era were expressed through the 
establishment of many Islamic parties using Islam as their ideology; 
for certain groups among Muslims, calls for the implementation of 
shari’a law, and the proliferation of radical Islamic groups such as 
Lasykar	 Jihad (Jihad Troops), Front	 Pembela	 Islam	 (FPI, or Islamic 
Defence Front), Hizbut	Tahrir	 (Party of Liberation), and Angkatan 
Mujahidin	Indonesia (the Jihad Fighter Group of Indonesia).1
The presence of these radical Islamic groups attracted attention 
from both domestic and international media and academics, mainly 
after 9/11 2001 in the USA and subsequent terrorist attacks in 
Indonesia. The strong allegation was that a number of radical Islamic 
movements, such as Laskar	Jihad and Jemaah	Islamiyah, were terrorist 
organisations, and targets in the West’s ‘global war on terror’. Not 
surprisingly, some scholars argued that the al-Qaeda network had 
spread into Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.2 Some argue that 
the radical Islamist movements were brought to Indonesia from the 
Middle East, which accounts for its militancy and violence as part 
of a global threat.3 This assessment of political Islam in Indonesia, 
however, is an over-simplification that ignores the variations in the 
phenomena of transnational Middle Eastern Islamist movements. 
Not all Islamist movements in Indonesia committed violence or 
terrorism. Gerakan Tarbiyah and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia were two 
instances of fundamentalist Islamic groups that were committed 
to physical non-violence. In this regard Ayoob argues that “most 
contemporary transnational Islamist activities do not fall within the 
jihadist description”4 and that transnational Islamist movements were 
very numerous, ranging from missionary (da‘wa) to political activity.5
This paper will focus on Hizbut	 Tahrir	 Indonesia	 (HTI), a 
fundamentalist Islamic group that eschewed physical violence and 
which was never known to be involved in achieving its goals through 
terrorist activities. HTI is a branch of Hizbut	Tahrir (HT) which was 
Mujahiduddin, Evaluating HTI’s Commitment of Peaceful Way 191
founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqiuddin an-Nabhani. He was 
born (1909) in Ijizm, a village near Haifa,6 in Northern Palestine. HT 
is a trans-national Islamist movement. Although, HT in Indonesia 
is a radical Islamist party, it strictly opposes violence and terrorism 
in promulgating its objectives. Ismail Yusanto, who is a well-known 
spokesman for HTI, argued that ‘in spreading its message, HTI 
holds to one fundamental principle, non-violence. To change people 
through violence will never succeed’.7
HTI is deserving of academic attention for two reasons. First, 
in general HT and HTI, like other radical Islamisist groups, have 
as their ultimate political aim, the establishment of an Islamic state, 
in the form of a Caliphate, over the world, beginning with Muslim 
countries or those countries, such as Indonesia, whose majority 
populations are Muslim. HT is also opposed to America, capitalism, 
democracy, liberalism and nation-states. However, it does not justify 
the use of violence or terrorism in establishing an Islamic Caliphate, 
unlike al Qaeda or other groups which commit acts of terrorism, 
justifying violence when it is used against kufr (non believers) for 
the purpose of restoring the Caliphate.8 Similarly, in an Indonesian 
context, HTI is unlike other Islamist groups, such as FPI, for example, 
which proclaims the legitimacy of the use of violence in establishing 
syari’a	law in daily life.
Secondly, some Western scholars view the presence of HT in many 
countries as a serious threat. Ariel Cohen, for example, encouraged 
the US to protect Central Asia from HT’s effort to destabilize it. 
He warned that HT was potentially the source of “the next wave of 
political violence” in Central Asia. According Cohen, HT promotes an 
anti-American agenda, tends towards extremism, and uses violence.9 
A similar view was expressed by analysts who use a security approach 
to warn about HT, but were less knowledgeable about Islam. Such 
scholars tended to conclude that HT was a terrorist organization “in 
the mould of al-Qaeda” and highly recommend the abolition of the 
group and a freeze on its asset.10 ZeynoBaran, for instance, portrayed 
HT as a ‘conveyor belt for terrorism’, and ‘Islam’s Bolsheviks’.11 He 
argued that HT has as its ultimate goal to take over of Western and 
Muslim governments to replace them with a Caliphate. Though HT 
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was not involved in terrorist acts, it was concluded after S-11 that, 
based on its ideology, HT was likely to urge its adherents to use 
terrorist acts.12 However, these assessments of HT, in the anti-Islamic 
political climate after S-11, were open to serious scrutiny because 
HT in Indonesia was not involved in violence and never advocated 
violence or terrorist activities. HT in Indonesia was not involved 
in any of the terrorist bombings against western interests after S-II. 
Ken Ward argued that one of reasons why HTI was acceptable in 
Indonesia is because HTI refused violence as a part of its strategy and 
did not have militia, unlike other radical Islamist groups.13
This paper is going to examine and assesses HTI’s doctrine of non-
violence in the context of the West’s post-S-11 war on terror in general, 
and the emergence of a democratic public sphere in Indonesia after 
the fall of the Soeharto’s regime in 1998 in particular. The democratic 
transition, and subsequent consolidation of democracy in Indonesia, 
had a profound effect on the political ideology and strategies adopted 
by HTI to achieve its long standing goals of basing all aspects of social 
life on Islamic teachings and law, and establishing an Islamic state. 
In this regard, the number of questions will be provided as guidance; 
did HTI have the potential to hamper the process of consolidating 
democracy in Indonesia, given that it used its freedoms to oppose 
freedom for other, ‘non-believers’? Finally, though HTI advocated 
‘non-violence’ and was not involved in terrorism, as understood 
by the west in its war on terror, did  HTI resolve the contradiction 
between its freedoms of expression and association and political goal 
of establishing an Islamic state and global Caliphate by resorting to 
forms of  symbolic violence? The answer to this last question is yes, 
posing a major contradiction for HTI that will limit its ability to 
engage in democratic politics and gain popular support, but also 
threatens the consolidation of Indonesian democracy. 
Violence: Meaning and Category 
To avoid the misconception of term “violence” in this paper, 
I feel need to clarify it. According Johan Galtung there are three 
forms of violence; direct, structural, and cultural violence. Direct 
violence includes killing, maiming, sanctions, misery, desocialization, 
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repression, expulsion, and so on. This feature of violence is easy to 
recognize, as it is ‘physical’, though most definitions of contemporary 
terrorism also stress the ‘threat’ of violence. This form of ‘violence’, 
according to Galtung, ‘tends to be institutionalized, repetitive, and 
ritualistic, like a vendetta’.14 Conversely, Structural violence and 
cultural violence are more complex. The key word for understanding 
structural violence is ‘exploitation’. Its simple logic is that ‘the topdogs 
get much more out of the interaction in the structure than others, the 
underdogs’. In other words, there is ‘unequal exchange’ in interactions 
and relations between actors.15 The process of exploitation is sustained 
by two other steps in structural violence. The first step is penetration 
combined with segmentation. The former means that the topdogs 
force the underdogs to speak based on the topdogs’ interests. The 
latter refers to the topdogs’ effort to limit the explanation of what 
really happens to the underdog. The second step is marginalisation 
combined with fragmentation. Marginalisation is an exertion to 
put and maintain the underdog on the periphery or outside, while 
fragmentation is to set the underdogs apart from each other.16
The final feature of violence, according Johan Galtung, is 
cultural violence.  It refers to any aspect of culture, including 
religion, ideology, language, art, empirical science, and formal science 
(logic, mathematics), that can be utilized as a justification for and 
legitimation of direct and structural violence. As a result, both direct 
and structural violence look natural and right, or ‘normal’.17 For 
example, as part of culture, religion plays a pivotal role in triggering 
violence because religion as a set of beliefs is easily manipulated 
by leaders to support violence by followers. For example, there are 
usually strict dichotomies between good and evil in which the former 
is quite often associated with God, or as revealed by God to the leader, 
while the later refers to Satan, with which the leader denounces the 
sins of opponents. Such black and white dichotomies create sharp 
opposition between ‘the Chosen One (by God) and the Unchosen 
Ones by God, chosen by Satan’. Those who are the chosen ones will 
receive eternal salvation and closeness to God in Heaven, whereas 
the unbelievers will are doomed to eternal damnation in hell with 
Satan.. According to Galtung, Heaven and Hell are also said to be 
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felt on earth in the form of misery and luxury, which are preparations 
for Hell/Heaven.18 This view justifies violence by believers who judge 
others to be ‘unchosen’ and unworthy.  
Meanwhile, Mary R Jackman in “Violence and Legitimacy in 
Expropriative Social Relations”, offers a definition of violence based 
on the ‘injuriousness of actions’. She argues that violence contains 
‘an action that inflicts, threatens, or causes injury’.  The form of 
the injuries ‘may be corporal that has consequences such as ‘pain, 
laceration, death, functional and impairment’, and are against the 
‘basic need of physical survival, avoidance of pain, and preservation 
of bodily integrity and autonomy’. It may be psychological including 
‘fear, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, or diminished self-esteem’, 
encompassing ‘the destruction, loss, or defacement of property or the 
loss of earnings’, or it may be social which includes ‘stigmatization, 
exclusion, imprisonment, banishment, or expulsion’.19 Violence ‘may 
be corporal, written, or verbal’. Because corporal violence is more 
easily identified, actors or agents of violence often try to use written 
or verbal means instead. Such ways may lead to injurious results 
either directly, ‘as in formal edicts or contracts stipulating physical 
harm against an individual or group’, or indirectly such as a ‘a moral 
or physical threat’ against individuals or groups.20
By considering these definitions of violence, it can be said that 
the forms it can take are diverse, ranging from direct or physical to 
symbolic violence, and which may be committed in various ways. 
Related to the assessment of HizbutUtTahrir	Indonesia in this writing, 
what is relevant from Galtung’s conception of violence is that religion 
has the potential to justify or legitimise violence. It does not mean 
that religion is inherently violent or will lead inevitably to violence. 
Whether or not religion results in violence depends arguably on 
the leader’s interpretation of the religion’s tenets and the fanaticism 
of followers. In other words, religion has the theological teachings 
and symbols to justify terrorist violence.21 Mary R. Jackman argues 
that the psychological and social outcomes of violence, publications 
defending violence and verbal calls to violence have to be taken into 
account.
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The Challenges to Democracy Posed by HTI
HTI’s appeal for restoration of the caliphate and implementation 
of shari’ah will likely pose several challenges for the consolidation 
of democracy in Indonesia. Widely held and mobilised rhetoric that 
rejects democracy as alien to Islam and its involvement in structural 
violence may undermine acculturation of democratic values necessary 
for democratic consolidation. In this section, reasons behind HTI’s 
rejection of democracy will be explained in more detail, followed 
by explanation of HTI’s involvement in structural violence and its 
vitriolic rethoric.
HTI’s	Refusal	of	Democracy
There are several specific reasons of why HTI strongly rejects 
democracy revolving around arguments as we have seen, that 
democracy allegedly contradicts the principles of Islamic governance. 
First, HTI sees democracy as a man-made political system that aims 
at protecting people from authoritarianism, injustice, and elites’ 
domination in the name of religion.  Because it is a human creation, 
HTI argues that democracy has nothing to do with religion or divine 
revelation.22 It has no roots in Islamic doctrine or history and thus 
it is alien to Islam. Second, HTI denounces democracy as secular 
because it is rooted in a political ideology that separates religion and 
state and relegates religion to the private domain. This contradict 
with HTI’s interpretation of Islam which argues for the inseparability 
of Islam and the state.23
Third, HTI explains that democracy is ‘ruling of the people, for 
the people, and by the legislation of the people’.24 HTI concludes, 
rightly, that it means democracy vests sovereignty and rule-making 
in the people. People are also able to revoke laws according to their 
own consideration and have a right to determine a ruler or leader.25 
This principle, according to HTI, contradicts Islamic governance that 
puts sovereignty into in the hand of shari’ah(God) and the power to 
rule (assulthan) to the umma.26 The right to make legislation belongs 
only to God and therefore all human legislation must abide by this 
principle.27 Fourth, democracy requires a majority vote as a benchmark 
in decision-making whilst Islam declares that not all matters may be 
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resolved by simply relying on a majority vote. Some cases such as 
the stipulation of legal matters should not be based on the majority’s 
opinion but must refer to legal experts.28Lastly, democracy covers all 
kinds of freedoms ranging from freedom of belief to personal freedom 
and has to ensure the freedom of every single person in order that they 
may implement sovereignty,29 Whereas Islam restricts the concept of 
freedom. For example, it does not tolerate the freedom of religion. 
One who wants to convert his/her religion will be sanctioned.30
HTI’s rejection of democracy is its appeal in the public sphere 
to tilt opinion to opposing democracy as the only political game in 
Indonesa. As it attempts to reach and recruit grass-root audiences, 
HTI’s attitude of denouncing democracy may disrupt the on-going 
socialisation of a democratic political culture that is necessary for the 
consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. According to Juan Linz and 
Alfred Stepan, democracy will only be consolidated once the three 
factors are meet:
Behaviourally, no significant institutions or actors spend 
significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating 
a non-democratic regime or turning to violence. Attitudinally, a 
strong majority of citizens believe that the democratic procedures and 
institutions are “the only game in town” to govern collective life in 
society. Constitutionally, governmental and non-governmental forces 
alike become committed to resolving conflicts within the specific laws, 
procedures and institutions sanctioned by the democratic process.31
In a same vein, Prezeworski argues that:
Democracy	 is	 consolidated	 when	 under	 given	 political	 and	
economic	conditions	a	particular	system	of	institution	becomes	the	
only	game	in	town,	when	no	one	can	imagine	action	outside	the	
democratic	 institutions,	when	all	 the	 loser	wants	 to	do	 is	 to	 try	
again	within	 the	 same	 institutions	under	which	 they	have	 just	
lost.32
From these quotations, democracy is consolidated when there 
is a shared conviction among political elites, political organisations, 
mass-based organisations and, more importantly, the public at large 
that democracy is a useful and worthwhile means for dealing with 
a wide range of social and political problems that come to surface. 
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Democracy is the only rule of game accepted by the state and all 
segments of society should take part in achieving democracy. It does 
not overlook the diversity of opinions, organisations and political 
parties. As long as the differences are played out under democratic 
norms, procedure, and expectations, political contests are acceptable. 
In other words, no group, for example, has the right to take advantage 
of democracy by enjoying the freedom of expression and assembly it 
confers to deny such freedoms to others, and disrupt or even replace 
democracy with another system.  This political scenario applies to 
HTI when it exploits democracy to promote anti democratic rethoric 
through mass demonstrations and public propaganda. In short, 
HTI enjoy democratic freedom to instill imagination of action 
and objectives outside democratic institutions in the public sphere. 
HTI challenges other civil society groups that aspire to support 
consolidation of democracy in Indonesa. This is even more the case 
when HTI utilises its politically influential networks to affect political 
change toward non-democratic goals, as will be described below.
HTI’s	Penetration	in	MUI
The growing political influence of the MUI provides 
opportunities for HTI to affect political changes that it aspires to. 
Using MUI’s network of religious authority is a strategic political 
manuevere, considering that HTI and other radical groups do not 
posses as much religious charisma as MUI. In addition, the influence 
of MUI’s religious conservatism grew during the decade after 2001.33 
President SusiloBambangYudhoyono when officially openning the 
National Meeting held by MUI in November 2007, welcomed the 
MUIfatawa, ‘legal opinion of an Islamic scholar’.34 The President also 
asked the public to stand firm against deviant beliefs:
…	Thus,	 according	 to	 rules	 of	 the	 game,	MUI	 issued	a	 fatwa.	
President	cannot	issue	fatwa.	After	the	fatwa	was	issued,	the	tools	
of	the	state	carry	out	their	duties.	Hopefully	the	cooperation	will	
be	enhanced	in	the	future.35
 The tactic used was to go into the MUI and assist its agenda 
on behalf of the MUI.36 Together with other radical groups such as 
DDII (Dewan	Dakwah	Islamiyah	Indonesia or the Indonesian	Islamic	
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Missionary	Council)37, HTI got involved in the Congress of Indonesian 
Muslims (KUII) held by MUI in April 2005. Through the important 
individuals in these groups, such as IslamiYusanto, Muhammad 
al-Khaththath from HTI and K.H. CholilRidwan from DDII, 
they succeeded in pushing the agenda of shari’ahas a congressional 
recommendation.38
As a result, at national conference VII on 28 July 2005 in Jakarta, 
MUI issued a number of fatawa.	  One was a ban on JAI39 (Jamaah	
Ahmadiyah	 Indonesia or Indonesia Ahmadiyah Community) since, 
according to MUI, JAI had recognised its founder, Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad as a Prophet after the last Prophet Muhammad. The notion 
contradicted the fundament tenet of Islam that there is no Prophet 
after Muhammad. Thus, MUI claimed that JAI was a deviant and 
heretical organization.40
In a further attempt to infiltrate MUI, together with other Islamic 
fundamentalists, HTI succeeded in gaining two prominent figures 
as committee members of the council for the period 2005-2010.41 
They were Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, holding the position of Vice 
Chairman of the Commission of Research, and Muhammad al-
Khaththath, serving as Vice Secretary of the Commission of dak’wah. 
The former Commission is in charge of conducting research concerning 
Islamic phenomenon and thus its findings form recommendation for 
the council when issuing a fatwa. The Commission plays a pivotal 
role. The aim of the latter Commission is to disseminate dak’wah 
throughout the country.42
Since MUI issued a fatwa banning JAI, HTI advocated issuing 
fatawa as an important agenda for achieving the public’s sympathy.43 
It also demanded the government ban Ahmadiyah.44 By utilizing FUI 
a coalition dominated by hardliners, with the FPI and Hizbut-Tahrir 
Indonesia as two of its largest components and a senior HTI official, 
Muhammad al-Khaththath, as its Secretary General,45 and also as 
member of MUI, HTI conducted demonstrations in favour of a ban 
on JAI46 and pushed the government to disperse JAI.47 In an article 
entitled ‘FUI	Minta	Pemerintah	Larang	Ahmadiyah’	(FUI	Asking	the	
Government	to	ban	Ahmadiyah), HTI and FUI urged the government 
to ban the Ahmadiyyah. “So that no horizontal conflict,” said Secretary 
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General Al-Khaththath, when he visited the Attorney General on 3 
January 3 2008. According to al-Khaththath, ‘freedom of religion is 
a human right. So if the Ahmadiyyah did not confess Islam, it’s no 
problem’.48 On 9 June 9 2008 the Indonesian government eventually 
enacted the so-called a Joint Ministerial Decree signed by the Attorney 
General’s office, the Ministry of Religion and the Ministry of Home 
Affairs,49 which required JAI to freeze all its activities.50 The decree 
declared that JAI’s adherents who did not heed the degree would be 
subjected to sanction.51
Considering HTI’s penetration in MUI and relentless pressure 
on the government in the JAI case, it may argue that HTI contributed 
indirectly to creating structural violence. HTI, with other radical 
groups, successfully utilised influential institutions, such as FUI and 
MUI, and the government to ban JAI. The success was marked by 
the creation of the fatwa and the Decree that certainly marginalised 
and intimidated the minority religious group which existed in 
Indonesia since 1925. Equally important, in ICG’s report entitled 
‘Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree’, it was asserted 
that ‘civil rights groups and many public figures argued that any 
state-imposed restrictions violated the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of religion’.52 The prohibition of JAI contradicted the 1945 
Constitution based on Pancasila, which guaranteed the freedom 
of religion. For instance, the First Article of Paragraph 28 in the 
Constitution declared that: ‘Every citizen has the right to follow his/
her religion and worship according to his/her beliefs…’.53 Also, it was 
not in accordance with principles of democracy such as tolerance, 
freedom of expression, and freedom of religion. 
Vitriolic	Rhetoric	
Referring to the definition of violence used in this writing that 
it may also be committed by using written or verbal means, such as 
making ‘a moral or physical threat’ to an individual or group, HTI can 
be categorised as a movement that uses violence. Despite never being 
proven to have carried out physical violence and terrorist activities 
in achieving its objectives,54 HTI sometimes utilises inflammatory 
and provocative language, mainly in describing non-Muslims as the 
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enemies of Islam. HTI, according to Ken Ward, performs ‘violent 
rhetoric’. This is because ‘HTI’s language is indeed often vitriolic as it 
denounces the enemies of Islam, the indigenous servants of capitalism, 
and imperialism, or the assorted social ills those forces have inflicted 
on Indonesia.’55 In an article entitled ‘HTI	Serukan	Perang	terhadap	
Pornografi’  (HTI	Calls	for	War	against	Pornography), HTI called on the 
government, the police, representatives, community leaders, and the 
Indonesian people to declare “war” on and to get rid of pornography 
from Indonesia.56 On 21 February 2008, around 300 members of 
HTI staged a demonstration in Bandung, demanding the Danish 
cartoonist humiliating the Prophet Muhammad be executed. ‘Capital 
punishment’ was the only course of action.57
In May 2012 HTI’s attention and anger was attracted by a 
planned Lady Gaga’s concert in Jakarta. The concert was cancelled 
eventually due to mounting pressure from conservative and Islamist 
groups, incluing HTI. On 25 May 2012, hundreds of students 
belonging to HTI did a street protest against Lady Gaga’s arrival 
in Indonesia. They recognised that her arrival was a form invasion 
by an unbeliever (kufr) that would destroy the younger generation’s 
morality. ‘We reject the arrival of Lady Gaga, because it contained 
disobedience and could damage the morality of the nation’s next 
generation’, said one student, Mauladina in a speech.58 Posters carried 
by students delivered messages such as: “Save our Generation with 
Syari’ah and Caliphate”, “Reject the Invasion of Infidel Culture”, 
“Lady Gaga Queen of Demon Lady Gaga Invite You To Hell”, and 
“Destroy Liberalism Rise Khilafah”.59
Like other Islamic Radical groups such as MMI, HTI argues that 
the concept of infidel (kufr) rest upon the ‘black and white’ paradigm. 
The notion ‘divides the world into two opposing halves, the world of 
Islam and the world of infidels (kufr), based on the idea of permanent 
conflict between truth (al-haq) and falsity (al-bathil)’.60 Therefore, 
according to Ahnaf:
The	 fundamentalist’s	 characterization	 of	 the	Other	as	having	a	
nature	of	 endless	 enmity	 to	 Islam,	 threatening	Islam,	not	being	
good	leaders	or	alliances,	and	inherently	in	perpetual	conflict	with	
Muslim	are	also	an	example	of	symbolic	violence,61
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Taking this description into account, it may be said that the 
use of negative images and rude language by HTI in drawing the 
Other (non-Muslims and Muslims who disagree with it) is a form of 
violence. In short, it is argued that HTI may undermine the process 
of consolidatingdemocracy in Indonesia. Its widely disseminated 
rhetoric that calls on people to reject democracy and its involvment 
in structural violence may contribute to the weakening of democratic 
culture necessary for the consolidation of democracy.
Conclusion
The presence of HTI in the democratic public sphere generated 
a series of ideological challenges. It faced the dilemma of an ideology 
that, on the one hand was clearly not in accordance with democracy, 
rejecting this system because it rests upon a secular paradigm that 
separates state from religion and the sacred cause. On the other hand, 
HTI accepted as a political reality that Indonesia is a state in the 
process of consolidating democracy.
However, HTI faced another dilemma. Though it advocated 
non-violence and was not involved in terrorism, HTI found it 
difficult to resolve the contradiction between its freedoms of 
expression and association, and strict rejection of democracy and 
the political objective of establishing a global Caliphate. This paper 
argued that HTI’s aggressive political rhetoric amounted to forms 
of symbolic and structural violence because of this dilemma. At the 
level of structural violence, together with other Islamist groups, HTI 
was able to influence institutions such as MUI and the state itself. 
HTI succeeded in placing its two prominent figures in strategic 
positions in MUI and pushing shari’a agenda in MUI. As a result, at 
National Conference VII on 28 July 2005 in Jakarta, MUI enacted 
a number of fatawa.	  Among them was a ban on JAI since it had 
acknowledged its founder, MirzaGhulam Ahmad, as a Prophet after 
the last Prophet Muhammad. This move was condemned as heresy 
because it contradicted the fundamental tenets of Islam that there 
is no Prophet after Muhammad. HTI succeeded in pressuring the 
Indonesian government to ban JAI. On 9 June 9 2008 the government 
enacted the so-called Joint Ministerial Decree, signed by the Attorney 
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General’s office, the Ministry of Religion and the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, which required JAI to freeze all its activities. The decree 
declared that JAI’s adherents who did not heed the degree would be 
subjected to sanction.
At the level of rhetorical or symbolic violence, HTI had potential 
to trigger disunity among religious followers, not only among 
Islam’s adherents themselves, but also between Islam and non-
Muslims, threatening to destroy Indonesia’s hard won harmony and 
pluralism and lead to future conflict. HTI often used inflammatory 
and provocative language, mainly in portraying non-Muslims as 
the enemies of Islam, the indigenous servants of capitalism and 
imperialism, or blaming them for an assortment of social ills. 
The writing argued that the involvement of HTI in triggering 
symbolic and structural violence more likely has the potential 
to hamper the process of consolidating democracy if HTI does 
not succeed in resolving the ideological and political dilemmas it 
confronts.       
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